The Constitution enshrines the Rule of Law as the inviolable foundation of the Republic—an idea elegantly expressed in the French phrase le principe de légalité: that every act of governance must be rooted in, and restrained by, law. This doctrine establishes a sacred boundary—no institution, however powerful its mandate, may act beyond the limits of authority bestowed by the Constitution or statute.
No institution, therefore, regardless of the puissance of its mandate, can operate beyond the four corners of the authority constitutionally conferred upon it. When the credibility of the Election Commission of India (ECI) is already under a cloud of profound scepticism from a significant spectrum of the political opposition, the initiation of the proposed pan-India special intensive revision (SIR) of electoral, ostensibly under a flawed and unsound interpretation of its powers, risks undermining not merely public trust, but the very constitutional edifice that is the grundnorm of our Republic.
A forensic deconstruction of the constitutional and statutory provisions reveals that the case for a nationwide SIR is not merely tenuous; it is a constitutional misadventure lacking any legitimate sanctuary in law.
The constitutional scheme disperses electoral authority across several provisions, with Article 324(1) placing the preparation of rolls and the conduct of elections under the Election Commission’s superintendence, direction, and control. But this is no blank cheque.
In Mohinder Singh Gill (1977), the Supreme Court noted that Article 324 was meant to fill gaps “which enacted law has not provided for”, since legislators “are not prophets but pragmatists”. Yet it also drew a firm boundary: the Commission’s discretion cannot be exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, or in disregard of law—it must remain anchored in the Rule of Law and consistent with statutory constraints.
This constitutes the first and most critical boundary: Article 324 is not a carte blanche to override statutory regimes; it operates primarily in the interstices, in areas ‘left unoccupied by legislation’. Concurrently, Article 327 empowers Parliament to make laws with respect to “all matters relating to… elections”, which unequivocally includes “the preparation of electoral rolls”. The primary statute enacted under this power is the Representation of the People Act, 1950. It is within the framework of Section 21 of this Act that the Commission’s proposal must be tested and, ultimately, found wanting.
Section 21(2) requires that electoral rolls be revised for every constituency before each general or bye-election, unless the ECI, for recorded reasons, decides otherwise. It also envisages annual revision at the Commission’s direction. This forms the regular, statutory rhythm of revision. The Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, through Rule 25, adds procedural texture—allowing such revision to be done “intensively or summarily or partly intensively and partly summarily”.
Yet it is Section 21(3) that the ECI now seeks to rely upon for its proposed pan-India SIR. A close reading of this clause reveals three constitutional and jurisprudential principles that squarely oppose its nationwide application.
First, Section 21(3) is an exceptional clause—a narrow, surgical remedy meant for rare disruptions, not a broad instrument of overhaul. It was designed as an emergency provision for localised contingencies, not as a substitute for the regular, nationwide revision process. To wield this power for a pan-India reconstitution of electoral rolls is to invert its purpose and let an exception consume the rule itself.
Secondly, the provision’s invocation is expressly contingent upon “reasons to be recorded”. This requirement is not a procedural formality but a substantive constitutional safeguard against arbitrariness.
In Mohan Lal Capoor (1973), the Supreme Court defined the legal essence of “reasons”, calling them “the links between the materials on which conclusions are based and the conclusions themselves”. They must show how the decision-maker’s mind engaged with the facts and reveal a rational bridge between evidence and outcome. Where this bridge is missing, the so-called reasons collapse into no reasons at all.
To justify a nationwide SIR, the ECI would need to show that the country’s electoral rolls are so fundamentally compromised that the system—despite regular, statutory revisions—has lost its integrity. Vague claims of improving accuracy or “cleansing” the rolls are no substitute for evidence. Only concrete, verifiable proof of systemic failure in every constituency could support such an extraordinary measure. Else, the exercise becomes ultra vires—a leap of conjecture, not a step grounded in jurisdictional fact.
Thirdly, the textual architecture of Section 21(3) militates against a blanket, nationwide application. The provision uses the phrase “any constituency or part of a constituency”—a deliberate legislative choice.
Had Parliament intended to empower the Commission to order a special revision across all constituencies, it would have used the phrase “each constituency”, as in Section 21(2). The very purpose of a “special” revision is to address a specific, localised pathology in a particular constituency or a group of constituencies, where the regular or annual revision process is insufficient to address an emergent and demonstrable crisis.
Moreover, the 2021 amendment to the RPA, which increased the number of qualifying dates for revision from one (January 1) to four (January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1), has further diminished the circumstances in which such an exceptional power under Section 21(3) might legitimately be invoked.
A nationwide SIR under these circumstances would amount to a constitutional transgression—a veritable felony against the spirit and structure of the RPA, 1950. The Commission’s discretion under Section 21(3) extends only to determining “the manner as it may think fit” for a special revision. Any “manner” of revision that imposes unnecessary hurdles for the citizens, presumes inclusion to be suspect rather than a right to be facilitated, or risks large-scale disenfranchisement through a disruptive, nationwide procedural overhaul, would be patently contrary to the constitutional scheme.
The ECI must, therefore, reconsider its course and adhere to the established statutory processes for maintaining the electoral roll. Its extraordinary powers must remain reserved for truly extraordinary circumstances and for geographically confined situations. To act otherwise would be to wound the very democracy the Commission was constituted to serve and it claims to serve.
Manish Tewari | MP, lawyer, and Former Union I&B minister
(Views are personal)
(manishtewari01@gmail.com)
