Oftentimes definitions can limit you, imposing unnecessary constraints, enclosing things within the four corners of a narrow, arbitrary boundary that you set for yourself. Other times, they provide no real meaning as the thing defined may not mean anything by itself.

Take the example of ‘Water!’. One might use it as a command to have someone else bring a glass of water, or as a proclamation at having found drinking water in the middle of a desert. Here, the word water, by itself, conveys no meaning apart from its usage.

Or for that matter, ‘Fire’. In isolation, it is a chemical reaction involving rapid oxidation that produces heat and light. But this technical definition tells us nothing about what the word actually does when used. Shouted inside a theatre, it would cause a severe panic.

Some definitions are agreements on the usage of terms or expressions, while others are about some essential attributes. While the former, known as nominal definitions, takes cues from predominant social conventions and vary depending on the social setting, the latter tells us about the terms’ real definitions or definitions de re, that is, about the way these terms are to be used and their essentialities.

A teacher explaining, say, the chemical composition of lactic acid would attempt to provide the real definition to her students. As Ludwig Wittgenstein notes in Philosophical Investigations, such essentialities are expressed by grammar. On the other hand, a builder, while giving instructions to his assistant, does not speak in the language of the approved sketch, but in a rudimentary language that has real meaning between the two. While definitions de re are necessary as a short-hand, they encourage confusion, especially when the term or concept involved is not one of science but one that straddles between the physical world and linguistic constructs.

Take the example of ‘law’. Any attempt at a real definition of the word would either simply be de dicto—that is, a definition based on usage—or drown in the pitfalls of the empirical method, leading us nowhere. Thus, the general description of terms based on grammatical rules may not always help us. The meaning of such words can only be determined by an analysis of the linguistic phenomenons. This is so as our language is intelligible only when we see it as against the background of human activities and forms of life.

Wittgenstein states that the plurality of language uses is similar in nature to that of games. Let us take the example of the word ‘games’ itself. Any de re definition would require to cover all possible varieties of games—be it played on a board, a pitch, or a screen. An easier and more accurate way to define would be on the basis of attributes. Even this may sometimes be difficult: while some games have a few attributes in common, these similarities can disappear.

While certain families of games carry resemblances that crisscross just like members of a family, what makes a game a part of a particular family may differ for each family—meaning that there cannot be a singular definition of the word ‘game’. As such, the question cannot be ‘what are games?’, but what attributes are relevant while identifying something as a game in the context of a particular ‘language game’.

This recognition of family resemblances is not foreign to our judiciary, though it remains unarticulated. Courts largely agree that definitions cannot always be ready reckoners in the legal process, but that such definitions still remain tools of interpretation.

Take the term ‘game of skill’. While the Supreme Court in Dr K R Lakshmanan (1996) sought to define the term as one in which success depends principally upon the superior knowledge, training, attention, experience, and adroitness of the player, it is generally acknowledged by courts that such broad-based definition of the term would not be workable.

In fact, the courts have emphasised that the question of whether a game is one of skill or of chance is a ‘question of fact’ that must be decided based on the specific circumstances of each case. This means a court will meticulously analyse the rules, gameplay mechanics (patterns of play, role of memory, and strategy), and the role of player decisions in influencing the final result. As such, the definition in Dr K R Lakshmanan remains only an aid, and not really the basis of any classification. The court knew that the predominance of skill was not measurable like temperature or weight; it’s a judgement call dressed in the language of objectivity.

Therefore, the de dicto definition by the court is but a judicial dance that appears authoritative until one realises it merely postpones the question. What does ‘principally’ mean? How do we measure ‘superior knowledge’? The definition defines nothing; it simply shifts the ambiguity to new terms, like a thimblerig or shell game where confusion is the prize.

Saai Sudharsan Sathiyamoorthy | Advocate, Madras High Court

(Views are personal)

(saaisudharsans@gmail.com)