Full report by Vismay Basu for The New Indian Express

Introduced in the Lok Sabha on December 15, the Viksit Bharat Shiksha Adhishthan (VBSA) Bill, 2025 constitutes the most far-reaching legislative intervention in the sector since the establishment of the University Grants Commission (UGC) in 1956. Presented as a reform aligned with the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 and the vision of a ‘Viksit Bharat’, the bill proposes a sweeping overhaul of regulatory, accreditation, and standard-setting mechanisms governing universities and colleges across the country.

Substantively, the VBSA Bill revives the long-contested Higher Education Commission of India (HECI) framework first proposed in 2018 and withdrawn following widespread opposition from academics, student organisations, and several state governments. While the revised moniker and official narrative emphasise trust-based governance, simplification, and institutional autonomy, the underlying architecture closely resembles earlier proposals aimed at centralising regulatory authority. The bill must therefore be read not in isolation, but as part of a long arc of policy reform in Indian higher education, marked by gradual centralisation, expanding managerial oversight, and declining public investment.

A brief history of public universities

In the decades following Independence, Indian higher education was shaped by a broadly shared developmental vision. The University Education Commission (1948–49) led by S Radhakrishnan articulated a concept of universities as autonomous public institutions devoted to liberal education, critical inquiry and research. This vision was institutionalised with the creation of the UGC in 1956, which combined regulatory authority with statutory responsibility for funding universities and supporting faculty development.

This consensus epitomised with the Kothari Commission (1964–66), which explicitly linked higher education to nation-building, social equity, and scientific advancement, and stressed sustained public investment. The National Policy on Education (NPE), 1968 broadly reflected this approach, reaffirming the role of the state as the primary guarantor of access and quality in higher education. The erosion of this model began gradually in the mid-1980s. The NPE 1986, revised in 1992, introduced the language of efficiency, select autonomy, and diversification, alongside the expansion of distance education and self-financing programmes. The establishment of the National Assessment and Accreditation Council (NAAC) in 1994 marked a decisive shift towards performance metrics, documentation-based evaluation, and managerial oversight.

A more explicit ideological turn occurred at the turn of the millennium with the Birla–Ambani Report, formally titled A Policy Framework for Reforms in Education (2000), introduced under the Vajpayee-led NDA government. The report advocated treating education as an industry, encouraged large-scale private and corporate entry, and argued for a reduced role of the state in direct provision. It triggered widespread opposition from academics, students, and state governments, who viewed it as a blueprint for commercialisation and exclusion. Although never formally implemented and effectively shelved after the change of government in 2004, its policy logic proved durable.

That logic resurfaced through the National Knowledge Commission (2005–09), which promoted rapid expansion, interdisciplinarity, private participation, and foreign universities as solutions to capacity constraints. Under UPA-II, this momentum found legislative expression in the five higher education bills introduced by Human Resource Development Minister Kapil Sibal between 2009 and 2012. These included proposals for a single overarching regulator, mandatory accreditation, regulated entry of foreign universities, educational tribunals, and measures to curb unfair practices in private institutions. While framed as reformist and consumer-friendly, the package combined regulatory centralisation with limited market opening and faced strong resistance over autonomy, federalism and academic freedom. They ultimately lapsed, even as the Yash Pal Committee (2009) warned against excessive fragmentation, over-regulation, and the erosion of the idea of the university.

Expansion without consolidation

Over this entire period, Indian higher education expanded at an extraordinary scale. From fewer than 30 universities in 1947, the system today comprises more than a thousand universities and tens of thousands of colleges, enrolling over four crore students. Yet, expansion has rarely been matched by consolidation of academic capacity. Chronic underfunding, faculty shortages, regional imbalances, and uneven quality have persisted. Regulatory bodies such as the UGC, AICTE, and NCTE emerged incrementally to address sector-specific needs, but over time this fragmented regulatory structure became a target of criticism for bureaucratic overlap, procedural delays, and inconsistent enforcement.

From the 1990s, these structural weaknesses were compounded by a gradual retreat of the state from direct public funding. The growth of private institutions, especially in technical and professional education, filled some gaps but also intensified stratification and student indebtedness. Governance reform increasingly substituted for sustained public investment, a pattern that forms the backdrop to the VBSA Bill.

NEP 2020 and reform

Over the past decade, higher education reform has followed a consistent policy direction: regulatory consolidation, outcome-based evaluation, and performance-linked autonomy. The NEP 2020 codified this approach, advocating multidisciplinary universities, flexible degree pathways, the dismantling of the college affiliation system, and a shift from input-based regulation to outcome-focused quality assurance.

Policy instruments introduced since then include the four-year undergraduate programme, the Common University Entrance Test (CUET) for central universities, academic credit transfer platforms, and expanded reliance on accreditation and rankings. Supporters argue these measures enhance efficiency, transparency, and global competitiveness. Critics, however, point to repeated disruptions of academic calendars, rising student costs, excessive compliance burdens, and the weakening of research ecosystems.

Universities have been required to absorb these reforms amid shrinking real-term funding, increasing contractualisation of faculty, and growing pressure to generate internal revenue. The VBSA Bill enters this already strained institutional environment, promising coherence and autonomy while deepening several of these trends.

From UGC to VBSA

At the core of the VBSA Bill is the repeal of three foundational statutes: the UGC Act, 1956; the AICTE Act, 1987; and the NCTE Act, 1993. In their place, the bill establishes the Viksit Bharat Shiksha Adhishthan as a single apex body overseeing higher education, excluding medical and legal education. VBSA is structured around three councils. The Higher Education Regulation Council (HERC) is responsible for governance norms, transparency requirements, and enforcement, with powers to impose penalties of up to ₹75 lakh and, in extreme cases, suspend operations or recommend closure. The National Accreditation Council (NAC) licenses third-party accreditation agencies and may allow high-performing colleges to award degrees independently. The General Education Council (GEC) sets academic standards, credit frameworks, curricular flexibility, and promotes Indian knowledge systems.

The government presents this separation of functions as a corrective to regulatory overlap and a move towards trust-based governance. Advisory roles for state representatives are cited as safeguards for federal balance. Critics, however, argue that substantive authority remains concentrated at the Centre.

Funding sans statute

The most consequential shift is the complete delinking of regulation from funding. Unlike the UGC, which combined oversight with statutory responsibility for grants and fellowships, VBSA has no direct funding mandate. Public funding is to be channelled through ministerial schemes and a proposed VBSA Fund, subject to executive discretion. This marks a change in the political economy. When funding ceases to be a statutory entitlement, universities become dependent on annual budgetary priorities, competitive schemes, and internal revenue generation. This undermines long-term academic planning and disproportionately affects research-intensive and regionally located public universities. Public funding is thus transformed from a guaranteed commitment into an administrative instrument, reinforcing a model in which institutions rely on fees, loans, and private partnerships. Universities serving first-gen learners and marginalised communities are likely to bear the greatest costs.

Centralisation and federalism

Although education is on the Concurrent List, the VBSA Bill centralises authority in ways that have revived federal concerns. The Centre retains powers to issue binding policy directions, supersede the Commission, and control appellate mechanisms. Several state governments and opposition parties argue that these provisions undermine democratic accountability and state autonomy, prompting the bill’s referral to a Joint Parliamentary Committee. Uniform national standards, critics contend, risk functioning as instruments of exclusion in resource-poor states where institutions lack the capacity to meet accreditation benchmarks without additional support.

The bill’s emphasis on compulsory accreditation and penalties has drawn particular scrutiny. The compliance regime risks intensifying documentation-driven governance in a sector already burdened by reporting requirements. Experience with rankings and accreditation suggests that metric optimisation often displaces substantive teaching and research, while faculty time is diverted towards compliance work.

There are also concerns about academic freedom. When institutions depends on meeting narrowly defined indicators, universities may avoid critical research agendas, controversial scholarship, or socially engaged teaching that does not translate easily into quantifiable outcomes.

Autonomy for whom?

Proponents highlight provisions allowing degree-granting autonomy for high-performing colleges, curricular flexibility, and credit mobility. Yet autonomy under the VBSA framework is conditional and unevenly distributed. Well-resourced, urban institutions are best positioned to benefit, while public universities serving disadvantaged populations risk falling behind. Autonomy thus becomes a stratifying mechanism rather than a democratising one.

For many in the academic community, the bill appears less a response to the material conditions of universities and more an extension of a governance model that prioritises central control, managerial oversight, and fiscal restraint. Without reversing declining per-student funding, without secure academic careers, and without sustained investment in research, regulatory restructuring alone cannot resolve the crisis in Indian higher education. The VBSA Bill ultimately raises a fundamental political question: whether higher education will remain a public responsibility or be progressively reconfigured as a regulated market. In its present form, the bill leaves that question unresolved.